Previous research suggests that women tend to be marginalized in legislatures or denied access to important agenda-setting resources that reduce their effectiveness as legislators after gaining office. However, previous studies have not been able to disentangle competing theoretical explanations for this marginalization. Some suggest it is due to explicit gender discrimination, while others suggest institutional norms such as incumbency are to blame. We address this puzzle with data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, an institution without incumbency, by examining gender differences in rates of bill sponsorship, bill passage rates, and committee assignments before and after the adoption of gender quotas. We find little evidence that female legislators are marginalized in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, tentatively suggesting incumbency, rather than discrimination, may explain evidence of marginalization in other legislatures. Furthermore, we find little evidence to support the notion that implementing gender quotas has negative consequences.
A re men and women equally integrated into legislative life? If not, what role do institutional norms and gender discrimination play in the legislative process? These questions are particularly pertinent as many nations use, or are considering, gender quotas to increase the descriptive representation of women. Although previous research shows gender quotas increase the presence of women in legislatures (Schwindt-Bayer 2009), some argue women remain marginalized, either by keeping women out of important leadership positions (Heath, SchwindtBayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005) , by preventing women from passing their bills (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Miguel 2012) or by restricting their activity to ''gendered'' issues at the expense of other types of policy areas (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Schwindt-Bayer 2006) . As a result, the benefits of quotas for women's ability to influence the agenda and promote their own policies may be limited.
However, it is unclear why female legislators continue to be marginalized, or face restricted access to political resources that reduce their effectiveness as legislators, after their numerical representation has increased. Critics of critical mass theory suggest increasing the number of women makes it more difficult for women to advance their goals due to increased discrimination from men (Bratton 2002; Kanthak and Krause 2010; Kathlene 1994) . Others suggest women face an incumbency disadvantage making it difficult for female newcomers to participate on par with men (Beckwith 2007; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Schwindt-Bayer 2005) . It is possible women are discriminated against by men once they obtain office. Alternatively, gender quotas encourage an increase in the number of new legislators within an institution with norms that reward incumbents and value experience and seniority, making it difficult for newly elected women to influence the legislative agenda. Existing research has not been able to determine which explanation has greater support.
We address this puzzle by looking at a legislature that recently adopted gender quotas, The Mexican Chamber of Deputies, but also prohibits consecutive reelection. 1 The lack of incumbency reduces incentives for legislators to develop norms that reward seniority and experience and may increase the probability that newcomers achieve their goals. Previous scholars have been unable to determine if it is primarily discrimination or institutional norms which favor incumbency that explain the marginalization of women. The Mexican case allows us to focus solely on the role of discrimination. The recent adoption of quotas also allows us to test our hypotheses before and after the enactment of mandatory gender quotas to determine if the increase of female newcomers changed the legislative dynamic, creating a more threatening environment for men as suggested by some scholars, or whether the dynamic remained the same over time. Previous literature has not been able to examine how the adoption of quotas alters behavior due to the lack of available data (e.g., Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Walsh 2012) .
Prohibiting consecutive reelection does not eliminate the possibility legislators will enter office with varying levels of relevant experience, in turn influencing the distribution of power within the Chamber (Murray 2010) , but it does remove the incumbency barrier and the resulting internal norms that reward incumbency. It is still an empirical question whether various types of experience influence behavior and the distribution of power, and it is one we address by controlling for previous legislative office and previous party leadership positions in the empirical models.
Overall, we find women's behavior before and after the adoption of quotas is similar, with no significant results suggesting women are marginalized by men in the Chamber. Our results provide little support for the notion that a critical mass has negative consequences for women (Childs and Krook 2006; Dahlerup 2006) . The results also suggest that ''newness'' has greater consequences than ''numbers'' for the advancement of women's interests (Beckwith 2007) . Our null findings tentatively suggest incumbency, and the resulting norms that reward incumbent legislators may explain, in part, why other scholars have found increasing the number of female legislators has not led to greater success by women in other legislative bodies.
Furthermore, we find women legislators are just as successful as men at getting their bills passed or obtaining key leadership positions. Women are also able to successfully represent women's interests. The findings suggest gender quotas are able to create a ''mandate'' effect, or pressure for women to represent women, without creating a ''label'' effect, where women elected through quotas are regarded as less capable and experienced (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008) . The results suggest ''quota women'' are just as capable as male legislators.
Theoretical Background
Legislators are marginalized when their access to important political resources are restricted by other members of the legislature, such as resources that increase the likelihood of influencing the legislative agenda and policymaking, thereby reducing their effectiveness (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Schwindt-Bayer 2006) . Female legislators can be marginalized through placement on less prestigious committees, by being prevented from serving in leadership roles, and by an inability to get their legislation passed. Marginalization is conceptually distinct from women's substantive representation, which is usually defined as ''policy making on behalf of women as a group...'' (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012, 232) .
Evidence of marginalization does not imply a lack of women's substantive representation. It is likely power norms within legislative institutions are gendered, such that less prestigious committees are often the ones that deal specifically with issues of particular importance to women (e.g., education, health care, women's rights), and women who specialize in these policy areas may be passed over in favor of men for powerful leadership roles (Franceschet 2011; Miguel 2012) . Thus, women legislators can still substantively represent women's interests, while at the same time be marginalized by other members of the legislature.
Numerous studies show female legislators are marginalized (Childs 2004; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Kathlene 1994 ). For example, the introduction of gender quotas in Argentina led to an increase in the number of women's interest bills, but women have had a more difficult time passing their bills (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008) . Research on countries with gender quotas has shown female legislators are kept out of important leadership positions and off major committees (Heath, SchwindtBayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005) . Others find female legislators spend more time legislating on ''gendered'' issues and less time on other types of bills compared to men despite similar preferences in other policy areas (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Miguel 2012; Schwindt-Bayer 2006) .
One reason for the difference in treatment may be institutional norms. Legislative institutions often favor incumbents over newcomers. For example, seniority systems develop to serve the goals of incumbent members (Mayhew 1974; McKelvey and Riezman 1992) . Even in legislatures with high turnover, there is often a small group of legislators with longer careers explaining the marginalization of women in legislative institutionswho dominate leadership posts (Jones et al. 2002; Squire 1988) . Newcomers are disadvantaged by a seniority system, as they must wait multiple terms to increase their influence.
Since women's entrance into legislatures in many countries has been due to quotas, many women enter simultaneously as newcomers. Newcomers threaten the existing distribution of political resources within a legislature, which may lead to the marginalization of newly elected members (Beckwith 2007 ). Therefore, newcomers are less likely to sit on important committees, possess influential agenda-setting leadership positions, or be part of strong intralegislative networks useful for promoting and passing legislation. Under this lens, female differences with men are more likely dependent on their status as newcomers than their status as women.
Moreover, certain legislative norms may not be gender neutral and may institutionalize gender bias within a legislative body (Franceschet 2011; Mackay 2011) . Seniority systems are but one example of a legislative norm that may institutionalize gender bias. Newcomers must often develop seniority within a committee to serve as chair (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 43-57) , making it difficult for female newcomers to compete with more senior male colleagues. Conferring prestige upon certain committees and leadership positions may also institutionalize gender bias. For example, classifying budget and rules committees as powerful, while committees that address education, health care, and women's rights as less prestigious reinforces the marginalization of women with particular policy interests (Miguel 2012) .
Alternatively, women's marginalization may be less about their status as newcomers and more about their status as women. The introduction of large numbers of women into traditional male strongholds of power may threaten male dominance (Schwindt-Bayer 2006) . For example, men can be rude and disrespectful to female legislators (Kathlene 1994) , and women are often excluded from powerful committees (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005) . Others find a reduction in support for women's interests from men as women gain more seats (Kanthak and Krause 2010) . In this view, male and female differences are due more to explicit forms of gender discrimination.
The Mexican Case
We test our question using data from three terms in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. Unlike many legislatures in which power is distributed based on seniority, all Mexican legislators are term-limited, preventing the development of internal power norms that reward longer-serving members (Aparicio and Langston 2009 ). If incumbency is the primary explanation for the marginalization of women, we should not find evidence of marginalization. Alternatively, if discrimination is the primary cause of women's marginalization, we should find women behave differently from men across a wide range of indicators.
Understanding the social context of gender inequality in Mexico is also theoretically relevant. When the societal context is not very favorable towards the equitable treatment of women, it may translate over into parliamentary life (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007) . In the 2009 Global Gender Gap Report, Mexico ranked 99 out of 134 countries on overall gender equality, with Guatemala the only Latin American country receiving a lower ranking than Mexico (Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi 2009) . In terms of political empowerment, Mexico ranked 65 out of 134 countries-near the bottom compared to most of Latin America.
Within this adverse context, Mexico adopted mandatory gender quotas in 2002 that stipulated 30% of all candidates running in district races had to be female, as well as one out of every three candidates on the proportional representation (PR) lists. Prior to 2002, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had adopted internal quotas, and the Congress passed a voluntary 30% quota law in 1996. However, there were no enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance, with many women placed in alternate positions or at the bottom of the PR lists, and the parties often did not comply with their own rules. The ineffectiveness of the voluntary quotas is evident in the decrease in the number of women elected to the Chamber from 17.4% in 1997 to 16% in 2000. The ineffectiveness of the voluntary quotas led women to push for a mandatory quota law (Baldez 2007) . After the adoption of mandatory quotas, the percentage of female legislators increased to 23% in the following two terms. The quota increased to 40% following the 2007-2008 electoral reform and the percentage of women legislators reached 37% following the 2012 elections.
Although adopting quotas led to an increase in the presence of female legislators (Baldez 2007) , it is unknown if women are marginalized after reaching office. In some ways, the parties have attempted to manipulate loopholes in the law to reduce the number of female candidates. For example, the parties have used primaries to select candidates, since candidates chosen through this mechanism are not used in calculating the quota requirement (Baldez 2007) . In addition, some parties have taken advantage of the alternate, or suplente, system by running female candidates as the principal (propietario) candidates, only to force them to resign in favor of their male alternate once in office (Méndez 2011) . This practice was eventually prohibited by Mexico's Federal Electoral Tribunal prior to the 2012 elections through requiring principals and alternates to be of the same gender.
Hypotheses
There are multiple ways to think about influence within a legislature. One way is to focus on the legislative process when women are present in leadership roles and when women sponsor legislation. Bill sponsorship is important because it serves an agendasetting function (e.g., Schiller 1995) . Agenda setting allows individual members the opportunity to advance their own interests and those of their constituents (Wawro 2000) .
Many studies have examined bill sponsorship related to specific women's interests, such as bills that address gender discrimination, health care, education, children, and family issues (e.g., Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Thomas 1991) . We adopt a more general approach, arguing the presence of women across a variety of policy areas is necessary to ensure women's voices and interests are represented in multiple domains. In the agenda-setting stage, when it is not necessarily clear how women will be affected by the adoption of certain policies, it is crucial that women are descriptively represented (Mansbridge 1999) . However, we also examine bills that address women's interests to demonstrate our general focus is not masking evidence of discrimination towards a particular subset of bills. In addition, outcomes are important too (Franceschet 2011; Jeydel and Taylor 2003) . Legislative activity without legislative outcomes means that policy change, especially for underrepresented groups, may not be forthcoming.
To test for gender discrimination, we examine gender differences in bill sponsorship and passage. We expect women will be less likely than men to sponsor bills or see their bills pass. If women are marginalized, they may be deterred from pursuing legislative tasks, leading them to focus on external legislative activities, such as constituency service. Earlier studies indicated that sexism led to less internal legislative activity among women and that women were less likely to have access to resources to pursue legislative agendas (Diamond 1977; Kirkpatrick 1974) . These expectations lead to our first set of hypotheses:
H1: Women legislators should sponsor bills at lower rates compared to men.
H2: Women legislators should be less successful at getting their bills passed on the floor.
Moreover, critics of critical mass theory suggest an increase in the number of women may lead to a backlash against women by men (Bratton 2002; Kathlene 1994) . When women are fewer in number, they may be more successful at sponsoring bills and getting their bills passed. If male legislators feel threatened by an increase in the number of women, we may see a reduction in bill sponsorship and bill passage rates of female-sponsored legislation after quotas were adopted. Therefore, we test our first two hypotheses before and after the adoption of quotas.
Women may also be marginalized through the assignment of leadership posts. For women to be successful at getting their issues on the agenda, policy gatekeepers must support their bills. Holding committee chairs or party leadership posts are important not only for the additional resources these positions provide but also for the policy gatekeeping powers they give to those who possess the seat (Alemán 2006) . If male legislators feel threatened by an increase in the number of women or are interested in preventing women's interests from getting on the agenda, we might expect few females to hold leadership positions. When women are few in number, men may pay less attention to female leadership posts. However, increasing the number of women may lead to a greater perceived threat. This discussion leads to our third hypothesis, which we test before and after the introduction of quotas:
H3: Females should be less likely to hold positions of leadership compared to males.
In addition to leadership posts, committee assignments are important for women to advance their agenda. In the deliberative stage, it is crucial women are represented on a variety of committees, since it cannot be determined a priori how women may be affected by particular policies (Mansbridge 1999) . While legislators are able to sponsor legislation on any topic, having a seat on a particular committee provides an informational advantage to committee members (Krehbiel 1991) . If female legislators are kept off the most important committees, it will be more costly for them to sponsor legislation in the jurisdiction of those committees. Quota adoption and the subsequent increase in the number of women may lead men (and women) to ''essentialize'' women, creating a situation where the role of women legislators is restricted to historically ''gendered'' policy areas (Mansbridge 2005) . A recent study looking at committee assignments in six Latin American countries (Mexico excluded) finds women tend to be placed on committees that deal with women's issues and social policy, are kept off economic and defense committees, and kept off power committees that typically provide prestige to members and/or provide members with influence over personal vote-seeking resources (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005, 421) .
If women are marginalized in committee assignments, we expect to see women's influence in the legislature limited to committees that focus on issues considered relevant to women, such as women's rights committees and social policy committees. We also expect them to be less likely to serve on prestigious power committees, as well as on committees that address policy areas historically dominated by men such as the economy and foreign affairs (Htun 2003) .
Mexico also has ''burden'' committees, committees like Youth and Sports and Citizen Participation, which produce very little in terms of legislation (Aparicio and Langston 2009) . Therefore, like gender and social committees, if women are marginalized, we expect to see higher service on burden committees compared to men. These expectations lead us to our final hypothesis, which is tested before and after quota adoption:
H4: Female legislators should be more likely to serve on women's rights, social policy and burden committees, and less likely to serve on power, economic, and foreign affairs committees compared to male legislators.
Data and Methodology
To test our hypotheses, we collected various types of data from Mexico's Chamber of Deputies from 2000 to 2009. This time period spans three legislative terms, one term before mandatory quotas, the 58 th Legislature (2000 Legislature ( -2003 , and two terms after the introduction of mandatory quotas, the 59 th (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) ) and 60 th (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) Legislatures. The Chamber of Deputies has 500 seats, 300 elected in single-member districts by plurality and 200 elected through closed-list PR. For the 1,503 principal legislators in our dataset, we coded the number of bills sponsored, how many of each individual's bills passed, membership on all standing committees (comisiones ordinarias), whether or not they were a committee chair, and whether or not they held an important party leadership position, such as caucus leader (coordinador parlamentario) or speaker (presidente de la Mesa Directiva).
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To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we define two dependent variables. Bill sponsorship is coded as a count variable that counts the number of bills each individual sponsored. Bill passage rate is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1 that measures the proportion of bills that make it through committee and pass a floor vote in the Chamber of Deputies. The passage rate is calculated by taking the number of bills passed divided by the number of bills sponsored. To account for legislators who sponsor few bills but have higher passage rates, we control for the number of bills sponsored in the bill passage model. Legislators who did not sponsor any legislation are dropped from the bill passage model. For Hypothesis 3, we use two dependent variables. To capture committee leadership, individual legislators are coded 1 if they served as committee chair and 0 otherwise. To measure party leadership, individual legislators are coded 1 if they held either the position of caucus leader or speaker and 0 otherwise. Hypothesis 4 is tested by using six dependent variables capturing membership on each of six committee types: economic committees, power committees, foreign relations and national defense committees, social policy committees, women's rights committees, and burden committees. This classification scheme is based on previous work by Aparicio and Langston (2009), Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson (2005) , and Schwindt-Bayer (2006) . We compare the number of committees of each type served on by each legislator. Our analysis is restricted to legislators who serve on one or two committees of each type. Very few legislators serve on three committees of any one type, and no legislators serve on more than three committees of a single type.
Our primary independent variable is gender. Legislators were coded 1 if they were female and 0 if they were male. We also include a number of controls that capture differences in background, legislative position, partisanship, ideology, and mode of election.
The background of individual legislators can influence their ability to participate effectively and their consideration for leadership posts (Aparicio and Langston 2009; Jones et al. 2002) . Unlike the United States, where majority party membership and seniority are key variables that explain who secures leadership posts (Cox and McCubbins 1993) , in countries with high turnover, the background and previous experience of legislators become more important for choosing leaders and assigning committee seats (Aparicio and Langston 2009; Jones et al. 2002) . Therefore, we control for legislators that have served as state deputies, senators, or federal deputies. For each type of experience, individuals with previous experience are coded 1 and 0 otherwise. We expect legislators with previous experience will sponsor more bills, will be more successful at getting their bills passed, and be more likely to hold leadership positions.
Mexico also has a strong party system where party leaders have substantial control over ballot access and the future careers of individual members (Aparicio and Langston 2009) . Senior party members who win office may have greater influence in the legislative process. Some of these senior party members become caucus leaders for their respective parties, but others may not possess formal positions that reflect seniority within external party structures. To account for this factor, we control for legislators who have served as party leaders in state or national coordinating committees. A legislator is coded 1 if they have previously served as a state or national party leader during their political career prior to entering the Chamber and 0 otherwise.
In addition to previous experience, we include the educational level of each legislator since one might expect higher levels of education to lead to greater policy expertise. Education is coded on an 8-point scale from primary education to doctoral studies. We expect more educated legislators to participate at greater rates, to be more successful at passing bills, and to be more likely to hold leadership positions.
To capture differences in mandate across legislators, we control for mode of election. Each legislator is coded 0 if they were elected in a SMD and 1 if they were elected through PR. Many scholars suggest electoral incentives based on electoral rules influence legislative behavior (Carey and Shugart 1995; Crisp et al. 2004 ). Previous work on Mexico suggests PR legislators sponsor more bills and are more likely to hold leadership positions, while SMD legislators spend more time securing pork and engaging in symbolic politics (Kerevel 2010) . We expect PR legislators to sponsor more bills and hold committee chairs compared to SMD legislators.
In the models that explain bill sponsorship and passage, we control for committee chairs, committee secretaries, and party leaders. We expect individuals who held these positions will be likely to sponsor larger numbers of bills compared to backbenchers and also to be more successful at getting their legislation passed (Schiller 1995; Wawro 2000) .
We control for partisanship through a series of dummy variables for the National Action Party (PAN), the PRD, the Green Party (PVEM), the Worker's Party (PT), the Convergence Party (CONV), the New Alliance Party (PANAL), and a generic dummy variable to control for other minor parties and independents. The left-out category is the PRI. We expect the PAN to be slightly more successful at getting legislation passed since they are less likely to face a presidential veto during this time period. There should be no differences across parties in gaining leadership posts, since committee chairs and seats are allocated proportionally when no party holds a majority, which is the case here.
Ideology is a key variable for explaining the legislative priorities of individual legislators and their institutional position. We use W-Nominate scores from the roll-call voting record for each term as a measure of ideology (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) . Using the first coordinate only, we measure each legislator's individual distance from the chamber median. We expect more extreme legislators to sponsor more bills, to be less successful at getting those bills passed, and to be less likely to hold leadership positions.
In the bill-sponsorship model, we include the natural log of the number of days in office served by each individual deputy. Like most Latin American legislatures, Mexico has a suplente system whereby legislators can take leaves of absence. Deputies who serve a short time are unlikely to participate much compared to those who have served most or all of their term.
Finally, in the multivariate models, we account for legislative term by including dummy variables for the 59 th and 60 th Legislatures. The significance of these variables could be explained by two possible theories. The marginalization hypothesis suggests an increase in women may lead to changes in behavior among male and female legislators. Since quotas were only in effect for the 59 th and 60 th Legislatures, we might expect differences in behavior between the two latter terms and the 58 th Legislature, but no differences between the 59 th and 60 th Legislatures. However, other scholars have suggested a relationship between an increase in electoral competition and legislative performance (Beer 2003) . Elections only became seriously competitive in the late 1990s in Mexico, and since the PRI first lost majority control of the Chamber of Deputies in the 1997 elections, the importance of Congress in the policymaking process has increased along with an increase in activity. We expect increasing competition to be reflected in an explaining the marginalization of women in legislative institutionsincrease in bill sponsorship over time, such that there will be the most activity in the 60 th Legislature, somewhat less activity in the 59 th Legislature, and the least amount of activity in the 58 th Legislature. The reverse should be true for bill passage rates. To distinguish between these two theories, we include interaction terms between gender and the two legislative-term dummy variables. The key for differentiating between these two explanations lies in distinguishing between a monotonic increase in activity across the three terms (the electoral-competition hypothesis) and a change between the 58 th and the 59 th Legislature, with little differences between the latter two terms (the marginalization hypothesis).
Results
We start in Table 1 by examining differences in the mean levels of bill sponsorship and bill passage rates between male and female legislators. We find across all three legislative terms that women sponsor slightly more bills than men, although the difference does not become significant until the most recent legislative session. Table 1 also shows no significant differences in legislative success between male and female legislators.
While there may be few differences in sponsorship and passage rates across male and female legislators, it might be the case that women's interest bills, such as bills submitted to the Gender Committee, are less likely to pass. While most bills submitted to the Gender Committee are sponsored by female legislators, a substantial number of these bills pass a floor vote. In the 58 th Legislature, a majority of bills sponsored by women sent to the Gender Committee passed a floor vote, and in the 59 th and 60 th Legislatures, about 40% of these bills passed. The passage rate of this subset of bills is much higher than the overall passage rate, suggesting women are not only equally successful at getting their legislation passed compared to men but are even more successful when these bills relate to women's interests. This evidence also supports the notion that quotas can create mandate effects without label effects (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008) .
However, other variables besides gender may explain sponsorship and passage. Model 1 in Table 2 uses negative binomial regression to explain the number of bills sponsored by each individual legislator. 3 Most variables in the model generally perform as expected. Committee chairs, secretaries, and party leaders sponsor more bills than backbenchers. We also find PR legislators sponsor more legislation than their counterparts elected in SMDs. Partisanship and ideology also seem to matter in terms of bill sponsorship. Compared to PRI, the smaller parties sponsor more bills, while PAN sponsors significantly fewer bills. We find little impact for previous experience on levels of bill sponsorship. Legislators with previous legislative experience are not necessarily more productive. We do find some evidence that legislators with previous state-level legislative experience sponsor more bills (at the p , .06 level, two-tailed test). Legislators who held party leadership positions at the state or national level do not sponsor more or less bills than other legislators. However, we do find highly educated legislators sponsor more bills. In sum, except for education, the previous experience of legislators adds little to our explanation of bill sponsorship activity.
To determine the effect of gender and increasing the number of female legislators on levels of bill sponsorship, we included interaction terms between gender and legislative term. We use Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) to generate the expected number of bills sponsored for the median male and female legislator by legislative term with 95% confidence intervals. If the confidence intervals for male and female legislators do not overlap for any of the three legislative terms, then we can be confident that male and female legislators were engaging in significantly different behavior. However, as seen in Table 3 , the confidence intervals overlap for all terms, suggesting two conclusions. First, women sponsor bills at a rate comparable to men. Second, quotas did not have an effect on bill sponsorship. The increase in the number of women did not lead men to attempt to suppress women's sponsorship activity.
Model 2 in Table 2 examines the determinants of individual bill passage rates. We find committee chairs and party leaders are more successful at getting their legislation passed compared to backbenchers. PAN legislators are also more likely to get their legislation passed, as expected. Previous experience has little effect on a legislator's ability to get their bills passed. Legislators are equally likely to see their bills pass in the Chamber regardless of education, previous legislative experience, or previous experience as a party leader.
To determine the influence of gender and legislative term on passage rates, we generated the expected passage rates for the median male and female legislator across each legislative term. The expected bill passage rates for male and female legislators, displayed in Table 3 , are extremely similar across all three terms, confirming the results found in Table 1 . We also find no evidence suggesting that gender quotas had differential effects on male and female legislators in their ability to pass legislation after 2003. Instead, we see that passage rates have decreased over time, most likely due to the gradual increase in bill sponsorship activity across the three terms.
In sum, there is little evidence to support the marginalization hypothesis from Hypotheses 1 and 2. Women legislators participate, if anything, at higher rates than their male colleagues, not less, and are just as effective at seeing their legislation passed through the Chamber of Deputies. We also tested to see if the marginalization of women may become more apparent after the increase in the number of female legislators, yet we also find little support for this possibility. The implementation of gender quotas increased the number of women present in the Chamber of Deputies but did not negatively impact women's legislative activity.
Hypothesis 3 suggests women will be discriminated against in leadership assignments. The adoption of quotas may exacerbate these differences. To test this hypothesis, we first compare the percentage of male and female legislators who hold these positions. Overall, 2.0% of women held a party leadership position in our sample, compared to 2.5% of men. This difference is not significant according to a two-tailed t-test (p , .05), nor do we find significant differences when we examine party leadership by term. In the 58 th Legislature, 10.3% of men held committee chairs compared to 9.5% of women. In the 59 th Legislature, 11.9% of men held committee chairs compared to 5.8% of women, and in the 60 th Legislature, 11.4% of men held these positions compared to 8.2% of women. It is evident that a smaller percentage of women held committee chairs after the introduction of quotas, although none of these differences across each legislative term are significantly different according to a two-tailed t-test (p , .05).
To further pursue the hypothesis that women are less likely to obtain committee chairs, we perform logistic regression in Model 3, Table 2 . We find bettereducated legislators and legislators with previous Chamber experience are more likely to be committee chairs. PR legislators are also more likely to serve as committee chairs compared to SMD legislators.
To test for the effect of quota adoption on obtaining a committee chair, we included interaction terms between gender and legislative term. Table 3 displays the predicted probability of obtaining a committee chair for the median male and female legislator, and we still find no strong evidence that females were significantly less likely to hold these important positions after the introduction of quotas. During the 58 th Legislature, the probability of a female legislator obtaining a committee chair was 6%, compared to 7% for males. During the following two terms with quotas, the probability of women obtaining a committee chair is slightly less than for men, although the confidence intervals overlap for all three terms, suggesting no major differences. Hypothesis 4 suggests women will be marginalized through placement on women's interest and burden committees while being kept off the more important power committees. To test Hypothesis 4, we compare the percentage of women who are members of one or two of each of the six committee types to their overall proportion in the Chamber of Deputies. In Table 4 , we find women were significantly underrepresented on power committees in the 58 th Legislature but not in the two more recent legislatures suggesting gender quotas may have had a positive effect on women's committee representation. We also find women are somewhat underrepresented on economic committees, especially in the 60 th Legislature, but not so for foreign affairs and defense committees. Women are much more likely than men to serve on committees that deal with social welfare, education, health policy, and women's rights issues and somewhat more likely to serve on the burden committees in the 60 th Legislature. From one perspective, these results provide some weak evidence in favor of the marginalization hypothesis since women are slightly overrepresented on burden committees and underrepresented on economic committees. However, after the introduction of quotas, women are not less likely to serve on the most important committees, the ''power'' committees, compared to men. If female legislators were being marginalized in their committee assignments, we would expect to see the greatest evidence in support of the marginalization hypothesis on precisely those committees considered most important in the legislative process. Yet, we find no evidence that women are kept off the power committees out of proportion to their presence in the legislature. Furthermore, we find that women are more likely to serve on committees that consider issues related to women's interests, suggesting they are more likely to be involved in issues specifically dealing with women compared to men, while at the same time engaging in other legislative business on the other committees at similar rates to men. Therefore, we argue the weight of the evidence suggests women are not marginalized in committee assignments.
Conclusions
Previous studies have not been able to determine if marginalization is primarily a result of explicit gender discrimination or due to a male incumbency advantage. To address this question, we looked for evidence of marginalization in Mexico's Chamber of Deputies, a legislature where evidence of marginalization could not be the result of a male incumbency advantage. Our study found little evidence to suggest women are marginalized in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. Male and female legislators sponsor legislation at similar rates, see their bills pass at similar rates, obtain influential leadership positions at similar rates, and are proportionally represented on most types of committees. The lack of evidence of marginalization is not likely a reflection of gender relations in Mexican society. As noted previously, Mexico has some of the highest levels of gender inequality in the world.
In addition, our findings provide little evidence that gender quotas have negative consequences. Although we find little evidence to suggest a substantial change in the behavior among men or women after the implementation of quotas, these results, if anything, suggest a positive effect. If women are able to advance their interests on par with men, the presence of more women in the legislature can only have a positive effect for the influence of women in the policymaking process (Mansbridge 1999) . Moreover, our findings suggest it is possible for quotas to create mandate effects without the consequently negative label effects (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008) . Female deputies are just as capable as men at getting their bills passed and at obtaining leadership positions, while at the same time representing women's interests through bills and committee assignments without being marginalized on other powerful committees.
We suggest the lack of evidence in support of our hypotheses is due to the different institutional structure Table 2 at their median or mode. (3) Values are the predicted probability of holding a committee chair for the median legislator, holding all other variables from Model 3, Table 2 at their median or mode.
of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies that is a result of the prohibition on consecutive reelection. Specifically, the lack of incumbency prevents the development of institutions that disadvantage newcomers within the legislature. While somewhat speculative, our findings suggest that women specifically, and newcomers more generally, are better able to advance their goals in an environment that does not grant privileges based on length of service within a legislature. The results also suggest that seemingly neutral legislative norms, such as seniority systems (Mayhew 1974, 95-97) , may institutionalize gender bias within legislatures. Yet, gender differences still matter. The lack of incumbency does not eliminate the importance of gender for understanding legislative behavior (Beckwith 2007; Cowley and Childs 2003) . Women still spend more time on bills related to women's interests and serve on committees that discuss policy issues of particular importance to women. While all legislators are formally newcomers in the Mexican context, not all newcomers are women, and it is primarily among the female newcomers that we find evidence of support for women's interests.
We are not suggesting discrimination against female legislators does not exist in Mexico or elsewhere. Earlier in the article, we described how women candidates and legislators were discriminated against in Mexico. Furthermore, a bias against women among voters may mean that women candidates have to work much harder to reach office compared to males, another form of discrimination (e.g., Anzia and Berry 2011). What we are suggesting is that women who can overcome these hurdles and enter the legislature can be effective legislators when they are not constrained by institutional norms that reward incumbents and disadvantage newcomers.
